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 Taking Demands Out of Blame 
 Coleen Macnamara 
 1 .  Introduction 
 " ere are multiple accounts of the nature of blame. For example, according to 
George Sher, blame is a set of behavioral and attitudinal dispositions that have 
their source in a belief-desire pair: the belief that someone has acted badly and 
the desire that the one blamed not have done what she did or not have the 
character traits she has. " omas Scanlon argues that to blame is to change 
one’s comportment toward another in acknowledgment of the fact that she has 
done something to impair your relationship with her. A third account - nds its 
origin in Peter Strawson’s seminal work “Freedom and Resentment” and has 
since been widely endorsed by theorists such as R. Jay Wallace, Susan Wolf, 
and Stephen Darwall. On this view, I blame another when I respond to her 
conduct with resentment, indignation, or disapprobation; that is, I blame an-
other when I respond to her wrongdoing with a negative reactive emotion. 
" is view, the reactive attitudes account of blame, is the focus of this paper. 
 Anyone who takes even a cursory look at the reactive attitudes literature 
would be struck by how frequently theorists discuss  demands . Strawson 
told us that the reactive attitudes “are associated with,” “involve,” “express,” 
and “rest on and re\ ect” demands (1962, pp. 84, 85, 90). " ose inspired by 
Strawson have taken up this theme with a vengeance. Gary Watson sug-
gests, “" e negative reactive attitudes express a  moral demand, a demand 
for reasonable regard” (2004, p. 229). According to Darwall, “Resentment 
doesn’t represent its object as simply contravening one’s will, but as contra-
vening some justi- ed demand” (2006, p. 81). And Margaret Urban Walker 
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owe special debts of gratitude to Maggie Little and Joshua Hollowell for countless conversations on the 
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claims, “When we express and direct our resentment or indignation at a 
norm violator, we demand some rectifying response from the one who is 
perceived as out of bounds” (2006, p. 26). " ese remarks represent only a 
small sample of the demand language that pervades the reactive attitudes 
literature. 1 
 " e idea that demands are a key constituent of any analysis of the negative 
reactive attitudes is rarely challenged, enjoying a freedom from scrutiny un-
common in philosophy. " e literature on the negative reactive attitudes pro-
ceeds as if their connection to demands is too obvious to merit skepticism. 
 I think this is a deep mistake, and in this paper I press on this orthodox 
view. I argue that there are, broadly speaking, three ways in which the term 
‘demand’ is used in discussions of the negative reactive attitudes; each, I argue, 
is problematic. First, theorists of blame link the negative reactive attitudes to 
demands understood as a model or metaphor for the standing requirements of 
morality. In so doing they suggest that the negative reactive attitudes are at 
home in the deontic but not evaluative realm. " is picture is problematic. Sec-
ond, theorists put the term ‘demand’ to its other paradigmatic use: demand as 
a particular kind of speech act. ‘Demand’ is used in this way when it is claimed 
that to feel or express resentment, indignation, or disapprobation is to implic-
itly demand something. I show that this view is untenable. " ird, the term 
‘demand’ is used loosely or - guratively to point to the fact that the negative 
reactive attitudes seek a response. " is use of ‘demand’ is, to my mind, correct 
so far as it goes. Nonetheless I argue that it is infelicitous in this context. 
 I conclude by showing how little we have to lose by taking demands out of 
the attitudes associated with blame. To so reject demands is not to deny that 
the negative reactive attitudes are forms of moral address, or that demands can 
serve to hold responsible, or that wrongdoing warrants a unique response 
from the moral community. 
 2 .  From Demands to Morally Untoward Actions 
 Many theorists have emphasized the relationship between the reactive atti-
tudes and demands understood as a model or metaphor for the requirements 
of morality. For example, Strawson tells us that when we respond to another 
with a negative reactive attitude we “view him as a member of the moral com-
munity; only as one who has o] ended against its demands” (1962, p. 90).  Watson 
suggests that “the negative reactive attitudes come into play only when the 
basic demand has been \ outed or rejected” (2004, p. 234). He also tells us that 
 1   For other examples, see Hieronymi ( 2004 ), McGeer ( 2011 ), McKenna ( 1998 ), Shoemaker ( 2007 , 
 2011 ), Smith ( 2008 b), and Wallace ( 1994 ,  2007 , 2008,  2010 ,  2011 ). 
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the “reactive attitudes depend upon an interpretation of conduct. If you are 
resentful when jostled in a crowd, you will see the other’s behavior as rude, 
contemptuous, disrespectful, self-preoccupied, or heedless: in short, as mani-
festing attitudes contrary to the basic demand for reasonable regard” (p. 223). 
Consider also the following comments from Wallace, keeping in mind that for 
him the terms ‘moral demand,’ ‘moral obligation,’ ‘moral requirement,’ and 
‘moral expectation’ are all used interchangeably (1994, pp. 22, 38). " e negative 
reactive emotions are “focused emotional responses to the violation of moral 
obligations that we accept” (p. 69). " e content of the negative reactive atti-
tudes “is given by the thought that a person has violated moral requirements 
that we accept, requirements that structure our interactions with people in the 
social world” (Wallace  2010 , p. 323). Given that, for Darwall, to violate a moral 
obligation is to violate a moral demand (2010b, pp. 151, 156; 2010a, p. 35), he too 
links the negative reactive attitudes to demands: “" e connection between the 
concepts of moral obligation and wrong (on the one hand) and the reactive 
attitude of blame (on the other) is then this: What is morally wrong is what is 
blameworthy—that is, what is warrantedly blamed, if the action is done with-
out an excuse” (2010b, pp. 142–43). 
 For Wallace, then, a negative reactive attitude is a “response” to a violation 
of a moral demand. Watson and Strawson add that the negative reactive atti-
tudes depend on or involve “an interpretation” of another’s conduct or 
“viewing” the person as having violated a moral demand. " e negative reactive 
attitudes are not, that is, knee-jerk responses to another’s wrongdoing; rather 
they involve cognitions, and more speci- cally they, like all emotions, involve a 
construal of their object under an evaluative guise. 2 Just as fear of the ice 
involves a construal of the ice as dangerous and feeling pride about passing the 
bar exam involves construing one’s passing as re\ ecting well on oneself, so too 
do resentment, indignation, and disapprobation involve construing another as 
having violated a moral demand. 3 
 " ough there are a number of di] erent accounts of the relationship between 
an emotion and its corresponding construal, for many contemporary emotion 
theorists, including Wallace, the relevant construal is at least partly constitu-
tive of the emotion. 4 For Wallace, the negative reactive attitudes are in part 
constituted by one’s construal of another as having violated a demand. 
What’s more, once we have in hand the conceptual content of the negative 
reactive emotions, we also have in hand their warrant or - ttingness conditions. 
 2   See, for example, de Sousa ( 1987 ,  2004 ), Helm ( 1994 ), Nussbaum ( 2001 ), Roberts ( 1988 ), Sherman 
( 1997 ), Solomon ( 1973 ), Stocker and Hegeman ( 1996 ), and Taylor ( 1985 ). 
 3   " e fear of ice example is from Stocker ( 1983 ,  1987 ), and the bar exam example is borrowed from 
Elisa Hurley. 
 4   See, for example, Solomon ( 1973 ,  2004 ), Nussbaum ( 2001 ), Stocker and Hegeman ( 1996 ), Goldie 
( 2000 ), Greenspan ( 1981 ), de Sousa ( 1987 ,  2004 ), Roberts ( 1988 ). 
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An emotion is warranted or - tting just in case it construes the world as it ac-
tually is. (One’s fear of the ice is warranted if the ice is in fact dangerous, and 
one’s pride about passing the bar exam is - tting just in case passing the bar 
exam re\ ects well on the person.) " e resentment, indignation or disapproba-
tion one feels toward another is thus warranted just in case that person has in 
fact violated a moral demand. If she has not violated a demand—that is, if she 
is innocent of wrongdoing—resentment and the like are not - tting. 5 
 " us far I have been at pains to distinguish the various ways in which 
demands understood as standing moral requirements have featured in dis-
cussions of the negative reactive attitudes. Such reactive attitudes have been 
described as a response to, as involving a construal of, and as being war-
ranted by the violation of a demand. I have drawn these various distinctions 
not because the di] erence among these claims is of the utmost importance 
but rather to illustrate that theorists’ commitment to the tight relationship 
between the negative reactive attitudes and demands runs deep. " e plurality 
of claims made sends a clear message: demands qua standing moral require-
ment are the kind of normative material with which the negative reactive 
attitudes are concerned. 
 For all that, I think it is a misguided impulse. When theorists use the term 
‘demand’ as a model or a metaphor for standing moral requirements, they are 
using it to pick out what it is  wrong to do. " e reason is easy to see: demands 
 understood as speech acts are a ubiquitous part of everyday life, and they, where 
legitimate, make it the case that the target, absent exculpatory justi- cation, is 
wrong not to do as demanded. In other words, where legitimate, demands qua 
speech act place on their target a deontic burden. For just this reason, many 
 5   Wallace makes one more claim that is worth noting. For Wallace, the connection between resent-
ment, indignation, and so on and the demands of morality is essential to understanding what it means 
to have an attitude of holding others morally responsible. He explains, “[T]here is an essential connec-
tion between the reactive attitudes and a distinct form of evaluation, or quasi-evaluation, that I refer to 
as holding a person to an expectation (or demand)” (1994, p. 19). Here Wallace is not directly de-
scribing the negative reactive attitudes; rather, he is explicating the attitude or stance that leaves us 
susceptible to them, that is, the stance of holding someone to a demand or moral requirement. Accord-
ing to Wallace, to adopt this stance just is to be susceptible to the negative reactive attitudes when that 
person violates the relevant moral requirement. 
 " is attitude is perhaps easiest to isolate when we think of cases in which we decide to forgo it. 
Imagine your partner routinely forgets your birthday. For the - rst few years of the relationship you held 
her to the norm of remembering one’s partner’s birthday, thus feeling and perhaps expressing resent-
ment each year as your birthday came and went without notice. But as the years went on, you decided 
to spare yourself the inevitable birthday emotional distress and quarrel. Your partner, you concluded, 
is lovely in every other respect; it is in your best interest and that of the relationship to let go of this one. 
Letting go did not mean that you rid yourself of the  belief that she ought to remember your birthday; 
you believe that she should. Rather letting go amounted to jettisoning the attitude of holding her to the 
norm of remembering your birthday. With this attitude discarded, you are no longer susceptible to 
feeling and thus expressing resentment when she forgets your birthday. As a result, your birthday now 
comes and goes in relative peace. 
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use the term ‘demand’ to refer to moral requirements understood as the de-
ontic burdens of morality. 
 What’s more, theorists, especially Darwall and Wallace, use the term 
‘demand’ not just to indicate the morally deontic but speci- cally to contrast 
the deontic with the evaluative. For both Darwall and Wallace, the moral 
realm is rich, including not just morally right and wrong actions but also good 
and bad actions—the morally commendatory and discommendatory. When 
they use the term ‘demand,’ they are invoking the distinction between the de-
ontic and evaluative realms, indicating a shiV  out of the broader realm of 
moral value into the narrower domain of the  required , the  forbidden —the 
 wrong (Darwall  2010a , pp. 31, 35; Wallace  1994 , pp. 37, 38). 
 When theorists link the negative reactive attitudes to demands, then, they are 
identifying them as creatures of the deontic and not of the evaluative realm. But 
while it is certainly true that resentment, indignation, and disapprobation are 
responses to, involve a construal of, and are warranted by moral wrongs, is it 
really that obvious that the same cannot be said of these attitudes and moral bad? 
 Consider, for example, the following scenario: You are a graduate student 
and you have a paper due in exactly twenty hours. Your plan is to stay seated at 
your desk typing away until the paper is - nished. It just so happens that you 
have three library books due today, and though it would not be the end of the 
world if you failed to return them on time, your roommate, another graduate 
student, is headed to campus. You ask her if she will return your books for you. 
She says no. She refuses, not because she won’t be near the library and her day 
is jam-packed, but simply because she doesn’t feel like it. You react with resent-
ment: you bite your tongue, but you think to yourself, “What a jerk!” 6 
 Given the details of the case, it does not seem that this is a favor the room-
mate is  required to do; that is, it is something of a stretch to characterize the 
roommate’s refusal as, strictly speaking,  wrong . At the same time, her refusal is 
far from morally neutral: it certainly comes at a cost to both the roommate 
relationship and more broadly to the moral relationship of mutual regard. And 
while this cost is not the sort to render the refusal wrong, it arguably renders it 
bad. But if this is right, and if resentment in this case is apt—as it certainly 
seems to be—then this vignette speaks against the claim that the negative re-
active attitudes live exclusively in the deontic realm. 
 But we need not rely on these intuitions to show that the negative reactive 
attitudes have a place in the evaluative realm. Re\ ection suggests that we 
should  expect moral bad to have an interpersonal footprint—a pragmatic 
upshot in our moral psychological states and attitudes. Whatever else we say 
 I address how the argument of this section a] ects our understanding of the stance that leaves us 
susceptible to the negative reactive attitudes in note 11. 
 6   I borrow this example from Driver ( 1992 ). 
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about morally bad actions, it is clear that they have moral signi- cance for us. 
Add to this the fact that it is via our moral psychological states and attitudes 
that creatures like us take up or register matters of moral import, and it 
becomes natural to expect the moral bad to have a pragmatic upshot. 
 Wallace would be the - rst to admit this, but on his picture the moral 
 emotional reactions associated with bad are not resentment, indignation, and 
 disapprobation; rather they are moral sentiments of some other kind (1994, 
pp. 63–64). As far I can tell, his only reason for thinking this is that he has 
 antecedently de- ned the negative reactive attitudes in terms of the deontic. 
And he has done this because for him the negative reactive attitudes are key 
components of our practices of holding responsible, and these practices, he 
contends, are intuitively about the concepts of moral obligation, moral right, 
and moral wrong (p. 52). But absent the intuition that holding responsible is 
exclusively about the deontic, Wallace’s position on the moral sentiments asso-
ciated with bad seems unmotivated. 
 What’s more, re\ ection on the nature of bad and wrong in conjunction with 
Wallace’s own (and, I would argue, correct) description of the negative reactive 
attitudes suggests that the - t between these attitudes and bad is as tight as that 
between these attitudes and wrong. Morally bad and morally wrong action 
share a core element: both thwart the values at the heart of morality. 7 To be 
sure, determining when the thwarting of moral values warrants the label of 
‘bad’ as opposed to ‘wrong’ is a di!  cult, complicated matter. Nor is it immedi-
ately clear what di] erence the distinction between bad and wrong makes from 
the perspective of the moral agent deliberating about how to act. I myself 
endorse Margaret Little’s (forthcoming) view that while wrong action neces-
sarily betrays some weak will, de- ciency of discernment, or di!  culty in delib-
erating on part of the agent, bad action need not. But the fact that the distinction 
between bad and wrong brings to the fore deep and di!  cult philosophical 
questions should not obscure the point that concerns us here: namely, that bad 
and wrong action are bad and wrong because they thwart values at the heart of 
morality. With this in mind, consider Wallace’s apt description of the reactive 
attitudes: 
 To respond to wrongdoing with one of these reactive emotions is a way 
of being exercised by immorality, taking it to heart that the values around 
which our common social life is organized have been \ outed or under-
mined. A disposition to respond emotionally to immorality in these ways 
is a sign that one cares about the values at the heart of morality. One does 
not merely acknowledge that it is valuable to relate to people on a basis 
of respect and regard; one values this way of relating to people, with the 
emotional vulnerability that is characteristic of the broader phenomenon 
 7   I borrowed the lovely phrase “values at the heart of morality” from Wallace ( 2010 , p. 324). 
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of valuing on occasions when what one cares about has been damaged or 
insulted in some way (2010, pp. 323–24). 
 According to Wallace, we are susceptible to the reactive attitudes in virtue of 
caring about the values at the heart of morality, and the negative reactive atti-
tudes are simply our way of taking to heart, or becoming exercised by, the fact 
that the values we care about have been thwarted in some way. But if this is a 
correct description of the negative reactive attitudes, and if it is true, as I sug-
gested earlier, that both morally wrong and morally bad actions thwart the 
values at the heart of morality, then the negative reactive attitudes are properly 
thought of as responses to both morally wrong and morally bad actions. 
 To be sure, one might continue to insist that negative reactive attitudes have 
a privileged connection to demands and thus wrong. Some, for example, reject 
the existence of moral bad. If one holds that bad exists in other normative 
realms, the aesthetic or epistemic, for instance, but not in the moral realm, 
then it is obvious that the  moral negative reactive attitudes live solely in the 
deontic realm. " ey have, as it were, nowhere else to go. 
 Or one might be led to the view that negative reactive attitudes are war-
ranted only in the case of wrongdoing because one construes these attitudes as 
being heavy-handed in some way. As I will explain in detail in the next section, 
Darwall maintains that reactive attitudes are tacit demands qua speech act. For 
Darwall, then, resentment, indignation, and so on are heavy-handed insofar as 
they are an exercise of authority over another. For Darwall, this is an authority 
we simply do not possess unless another’s action rises to the level of wrong. 
But one need not think the reactive attitudes are tacit demands to think that 
they are heavy-handed. " e tendency in the literature is to model the reactive 
attitudes on sanctions—and sanctions are weighty in their own right. 8 If reac-
tive attitudes are sanctions, then arguably to deserve such a punitive response 
one must act in a way that is wrong and not just bad. 
 But it is far from clear either that the above metaethical view is correct or that 
the negative reactive attitudes are in fact heavy handed. " e claim that there is 
no moral bad is a controversial metaethical claim. And the view that the nega-
tive reactive attitudes are properly modeled on either demands qua speech act or 
sanction is far from obviously true. I object to the demand qua speech act view 
in the next section. " us, for now it su!  ces to notice that there is something 
deeply counterintuitive about construing the  unexpressed reactive attitudes as 
sanctions. In “Two Faces of Responsibility,” Watson expresses this sentiment in 
a question: “[H]ow is being subject to a blaming attitude a sanction?” (1996, p. 
238). 9 Perhaps it makes most sense to move away from modeling the reactive 
 8   " ose who construe the reactive attitudes as sanctions include Strawson ( 1962 ), Watson ( 1996 ), 
and Shoemaker ( 2011 ). 
 9   Also see Shoemaker ( 2011 , p. 617). 
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attitudes on punishments and sanctions and address them in their own right: as 
the moral psychological phenomena that they are. 10 Doing this might reveal 
them as having, metaphorically speaking, a rather light touch. 
 None of this is to say that at the end of the day one might not reasonably 
conclude that the negative reactive attitudes have a privileged connection to 
demands and thus wrongdoing. My point here is simply that absent some 
prior controversial theoretical commitment, this claim appears unmotivated. 
From the perspective of moral psychology, it seems highly plausible that the 
negative reactive attitudes are connected to the morally untoward in general 
and not exclusively to violation of demands. 11 
 3 .  Demands qua Speech Act 
 Another way in which theorists have linked the negative reactive attitudes to 
demands takes us into the territory of speech acts. It’s a familiar idea that we 
can do many things with words: we can  ask a question ,  warn our hiking com-
panion of the tree branch falling toward her head,  invite a friend to a party, 
 assert that a tree branch is falling, and, most important for us here, we can 
issue  demands . To my children I bark, “Clean your room!” To the stranger on 
the bus, “Get o]  my foot!” Demands are among the many kinds of speech acts 
we perform. 
 In  ! e Second-Person Standpoint and subsequent writings, Darwall fre-
quently draws on speech act theory in the course of discussing the reactive 
attitudes (see, e.g., 2006, pp. 3–4, 52–54, 75–76, 265–66). More speci- cally, he 
identi- es the reactive attitudes as forms of moral address, meaning that they 
are speech acts or “quasi speech acts,” and in particular that they are implicit 
demands: 
 10   I have argued elsewhere that when we start with the idea that the reactive attitudes are emotions 
we are led to the view that both the expressed and the unexpressed reactive attitudes are at bottom 
modes of recognizing another as having done something good, bad, right, or wrong. " is view of the 
reactive emotions is not incompatible with the idea that they are responses to both wrong and bad. See 
Hurley and Macnamara ( 2010 ) and Macnamara (forthcoming). 
 11   Recall that Wallace is unique insofar as he brings our attention to the stance that leaves us suscep-
tible to the negative reactive attitudes—what he describes as the stance of  holding someone to a demand . 
I agree that there is a stance that leaves us susceptible to the negative reactive attitudes and that this 
stance is a crucial component of the moral psychology of our practices of holding responsible. How-
ever, insofar as there is reason to think that the negative reactive attitudes are warranted by the entire 
class of morally untoward actions, there is room for skepticism about Wallace’s  description of this 
stance. If the negative reactive attitudes are plausibly construed as responses not just to violations of 
 deontic normative material but also to  evaluative normative material, then the stance of holding an-
other to a  demand will not leave us susceptible to the negative reactive attitudes in all the cases in which 
they are warranted. If I hold John to the deontic burdens he faces and not similarly to the evaluative 
burdens, then while I will be susceptible to a negative reactive attitude in cases of wrong action, I will 
not be similarly susceptible in cases of bad action. 
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 What gives Strawson’s discussion of reactive attitudes its special rele-
vance to the issue of free will is that reactive attitudes invariably address 
demands, and, as Gary Watson notes, there are “constraints on moral 
address” that must be presupposed as felicity conditions of addressing 
a demand (Watson  1987b : 263, 264) . . . . [T]he capacity to recognize and 
act on second-personal reasons is, I am claiming, a felicity condition of 
moral address’s having its distinctive “illocutionary force” (that is, mak-
ing it the distinctive speech act it is) (Austin  1962 ). (Darwall  2007 , p. 120) 
 On Darwall’s account, then, the negative reactive attitudes, whatever else 
they might be, are implicit demands. For Darwall, this holds for both the 
expressed and unexpressed reactive attitudes: “If you  express resentment to 
someone for not moving his foot from on top of yours, you implicitly demand 
that he do so” (2006, p. 76, my italics), and “in  feeling resentment or moral 
blame toward someone for stepping on your feet, you implicitly demand that 
he not do so, answer for having done so, and so on” (2010c, p. 219, my italics). 
 While there is strong evidence that Darwall regards both the expressed and 
the unexpressed negative reactive attitudes as implicit demands, his view on 
the propositional content of these demands is not similarly clear. It is not clear 
what he thinks the negative reactive attitudes are demands  for . He never ex-
plicitly takes up questions about propositional content. Perhaps this is because 
his broader project of arguing for the second-personal nature of morality 
requires only that the reactive attitudes make demands—not that they make 
this or that particular demand. 
 But the quotes above are suggestive; there are two views on propositional 
content that Darwall might seriously entertain. " e - rst is what I will call the 
“standing moral requirement” view, the second, the “acknowledgment of fault” 
view. Both of these views have some initial plausibility. 
 We can easily remedy this problem by broadening Wallace’s description of the stance. If the nega-
tive reactive attitudes are warranted by the entire class of morally untoward actions, then the stance 
that leaves us susceptible to these attitudes is not the stance of holding another to a demand but rather 
the stance of holding another to the range of normative material the violation of which renders an ac-
tion morally untoward. 
 What’s more, Wallace is inclined to refer to the stance that leaves us susceptible to the reactive atti-
tudes not just as the stance of holding someone to a demand but also as the “psychological stance of 
demanding” (1994, p. 22). But if the stance that leaves us susceptible to the negative reactive attitudes is 
the stance of holding another to the range of normative material that renders an action morally unto-
ward, then it is infelicitous to refer to this stance as the psychological stance of demanding. We need a 
more inclusive term. 
 My inclination is to use the term ‘normative expectation’ to refer to the stance that leaves us suscep-
tible to the reactive attitudes. Wallace uses the term ‘normative expectation’ to refer to standing moral 
requirements (1994, p. 22), thus I am urging a use that diverges from his. One point in my favor is that 
my use honors, in a way that Wallace’s does not, the fact that ‘normative expectation’ is in the - rst 
instance a psychological term. 
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 " e standing moral requirement view piggybacks on the idea that the nega-
tive reactive attitudes are intimately connected to demands understood as 
standing moral requirements. As we saw in the previous section, theorists 
claim that resentment, indignation, and disapprobation are responses to, 
involve a construal of, and are warranted by the violation of a demand qua 
standing moral requirement. " e standing moral requirement view of content 
merely pushes the connection between a negative reactive attitude and the 
moral requirement with which it is correlated one step further: it claims that 
the negative reactive attitudes, as it were, give voice to or issue the demand that 
underwrites them. Most precisely, on this view the content of the demand con-
stitutive of the negative reactive attitude mirrors the content of the standing 
moral requirement whose violation prompted it. To be sure, the fact that re-
sentment, indignation, and disapprobation are responses to, involve a construal 
of, or are warranted by a particular demand qua moral requirement does not 
 entail that they themselves issue a demand, let alone a demand with the same 
content. But the already tight connection between the negative reactive atti-
tudes and standing moral requirements renders this view of content plausible. 12 
 On the acknowledgment of fault view, a negative reactive attitude is a tacit 
demand that its target acknowledge her fault, where this includes both feeling 
guilt and expressing it via apology and amends. 13 " e plausibility of this ac-
count of the content comes into view when we remind ourselves that there is a 
certain sort of propriety in the target of a demand doing as the propositional 
content directs. " us to say that the negative reactive attitudes demand that 
their target feel guilt and express it via apology and amends is to suggest that it 
is in some sense appropriate for the target to respond in this way. 
 " is sentiment - nds considerable support in the literature. For example, 
Walker ( 2006 , pp. 125, 138) and Shoemaker ( 2007 , pp. 91, 100) join Darwall in 
countenancing this idea. What’s more, it is quite intuitive. " ere is, aV er all, 
nothing as satisfying as having one’s blame met with a sincere apology and 
reparations. Such a response tends to dissipate even intense feelings of resent-
ment or indignation. Further, wrongdoing creates riV s in relationships, strain-
ing and tearing the fabric of the moral community. If we are going to stay 
together, these riV s need to be repaired. Repair happens when those who have 
done wrong take up and make good on their faults by feeling guilt and express-
ing it via apology and amends. 14 " e fact that acknowledging one’s fault has the 
potential to catalyze moral repair certainly suggests that there is a propriety in 
a negative reactive attitude being met with this response. 
 12   For evidence that Darwall holds this view see Darwall ( 2010b , p. 155;  2006 , p. 76;  2010c , p. 219). 
 13   For evidence that Darwall holds this view see Darwall ( 2006 , pp. 71, 79, 85–86, 112;  2010a , p. 37; 
2011, p. 331). 
 14   See Walker ( 2006 ) for a thorough treatment of the concept of moral repair. 
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 But while both the standing moral requirement and acknowledgment of 
fault views have initial plausibility, they do not, I will argue, stand up to scru-
tiny. More broadly, in the remainder of this section I identify a number of 
problems for the idea that the negative reactive attitudes are tacit demandings. 
I argue that problems arise at three di] erent levels: - rst at the level of the bare 
claim that they are speech acts, second with the claim that they are a speci- c 
kind of speech act—namely, a demand—and third at the level of propositional 
content. Importantly, these critiques hold even if it is correct to con- ne resent-
ment, indignation, and the like to the deontic realm. 
 Let’s start with the claim that the negative reactive attitudes are speech acts. 
" is - rst point is a simple one. While it certainly seems right to characterize 
 expressions of resentment, indignation, and disapprobation as speech acts, the 
same cannot be said of  unexpressed resentment, indignation, and disapproba-
tion. It is di!  cult to see how an emotion that remains buried in one’s heart can 
be appropriately characterized as a speech act. To be sure, Darwall calls them 
“quasi speech acts,” but to identify them as such is simply to mark the awk-
wardness of identifying them as speech acts; it does nothing to explain it away. 
 A second strike against the demand qua speech act view is that the ethics of 
negative reactive attitudes and demands come apart: the former do not require 
authority and the latter do. Imagine that you promised to meet your friend for 
dinner on Friday night, but that before Friday rolls around someone you have 
had your eye on for  forever asks you out on a date: dinner and a party Friday 
night. It just so happens that this dreamy date and your engagement with your 
friend fall on the same night, so you tell your suitor that you will probably be 
able to go but that you need to make sure. You quickly call up your friend, tell 
her your exciting news, and ask her to release you from your promise. You say, 
“We can do dinner some other time. You know how much this date means to 
me!” To your surprise your friend, for no good reason, refuses to release you. 
You are quickly besieged by resentment—resentment that seems, given the 
history of the friendship and the importance to you of the event, to be war-
ranted. You know your friend has every right to refuse, but this date means a 
lot to you. You can have dinner with her on Saturday night; it’s not as if Friday 
night is her birthday or something. But while you think your resentment is 
- tting, you know you do not have the authority to demand that she release you 
from your promise. " is is simply part of the logic of promising. Once you 
make a promise, the promisee is in charge of whether you will be released or 
not. It is not for you to decide and certainly not for you to command. 
 Consider another case. You are on a crowded train and you witness the 
following: An elderly couple enters the car, clearly anxious at the thought of 
not sitting together. Seeing only scattered single seats, they politely ask a pas-
senger a few rows in front of you if he would be willing to move so that they 
can sit together. He says no. He is polite enough, but no is his answer. Witness-
ing this scene - lls you with indignation—indignation that, given the elderly 
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couple’s predicament, you think is warranted. “What a jerk,” you think. “What 
is wrong with people!” To be sure, moving would be an inconvenience, but 
only a small one, and it would be a great help to the elderly couple. But just as 
you know that indignation is warranted, you know that you do not have the 
authority to demand that he move. It is, aV er all, his seat, his to give or keep. 
He sat in it - rst, and on the train it is - rst come, - rst serve. If you got up and 
demanded that he move, he would likely respond by saying, “Who the heck do 
you think you are? You can’t demand that I move. " is is my seat!” And you 
know he would be right. 15 
 In both these cases unexpressed negative reactive attitudes seem in order 
and demands do not. If you share my intuitions about these cases it is likely 
because you take the reactive attitudes seriously as  emotions . Let me explain. 
 When Mary legitimately demands that Sarah ϕ, she makes it the case that 
Sarah must ϕ  because she said so . In other words, in legitimately issuing a 
demand to Sarah, Mary normatively subordinates Sarah’s will to her own. But 
to do something like this is to exercise a normative power. " is sort of power 
requires normative authority—precisely the kind of authority that the sergeant 
has with respect to his soldiers but you arguably lack in the promise and train 
cases. 
 Emotions, in contrast, do not require normative authority, and the reason is 
easy to see. Emotions are not - rst and foremost about subordinating another’s 
will to one’s own; rather they are, as we saw in the previous section, modes of 
recognizing a feature of the world under an evaluative guise. Modes of recog-
nition simply do not require normative authority. 
 Of course, this is not to deny that emotions are subject to various norms of 
correctness. It is widely agreed that emotions can be assessed in terms of a 
variety of norms. First there are what one might think of as internal norms, 
that is, norms that are indexed to the kind of thing the emotions are: forms of 
recognition. Emotions are assessed as - tting or not or as warranted or not, 
where this just tracks whether or not the emotion recognizes the world as it 
actually is. Our emotions, though, are open to a further level of assessment. 
" ey, like our actions and character, are subject to moral and prudential 
norms. 16 Warranted emotions are not, then, necessarily beyond reproach. For 
example, one’s amusement at an objectively funny racist joke is - tting, but 
nonetheless morally untoward due to its racist content. 17 Your resentment 
toward someone who has in fact done wrong may nonetheless be morally 
 15   I borrow this example from Driver ( 1992 ). 
 16   It is also true that legitimate demands can violate moral and prudential norms. " ough the ser-
geant may possess the authority to demand that his solider drop and give him - V y, it would be morally 
inappropriate for him to issue this demand when he is a guest at the soldier’s wedding. I am indebted 
to Maggie Little for this example. 
 17   " is example is from D’Arms and Jacobson ( 2000 ). 
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untoward because of your hypocrisy, that is, because you are an unrepentant 
violator of the precise norms to which you are holding your target. 
 On my view, to take reactive attitudes seriously as emotions is to see them as 
sharing key features with emotions in general. Importantly, this involves seeing 
the reactive attitudes as subject to the same standards of correctness as all other 
emotions. But if this is what it means to take reactive attitudes seriously as emo-
tions, we can see why doing so leads to the conclusion that in the above scenarios 
resentment and indignation are appropriate even though you lack the authority to 
demand. What is relevant to the assessment of your resentment and indignation 
is, - rst, whether their target has in fact done something wrong (or bad) and, sec-
ond, whether your resentment and indignation square with moral and prudential 
norms. 18 In both respects, your resentment and indignation - t the bill: your friend 
and the man on the train have both done something wrong (or bad), and there is 
no indication that your emotions violated a moral or prudential norm. 19 
 Just as unexpressed resentment, indignation, and disapprobation do not 
require authority, so too with  expressions of these emotions. " e promise case 
is an excellent illustration of this. It seems appropriate for you not only to feel 
resentment toward your friend but also to express this resentment to her—
despite the fact that you clearly lack the authority to demand. 
 " e train case may seem di] erent. While it seems perfectly appropriate for 
you to feel indignation, expressing it is another matter. But while the inappro-
priateness of both demands and expressing indignation seems to speak against 
my view, re\ ection suggests otherwise. To turn this apparent di!  culty into a 
solid objection would require showing that expressing indignation is inappro-
priate because you lack the authority to express it and not for some other 
reason— say, because you should mind your own business or, to put it another 
way, because expressing indignation here would violate a norm of privacy. 
 We can see that it is the norm of privacy rather than lack of authority that 
renders your expression of indignation inappropriate by considering a varia-
tion on the train case. Imagine that the man who refuses the elderly couple is 
a good friend of yours. In this case, expressing indignation could very well be 
appropriate. We oV en legitimately call out our friends for just this sort of in-
fraction. At the same time, though, friendship does not alter the economy of 
authority. It is still his seat to give or keep. 
 18   To be clear, when I say that the negative reactive attitudes do not require authority, I do not mean 
to imply that they do not require  standing . " ey do. On my view, to say that the negative reactive emo-
tions require standing is simply a shorthand way of claiming that they can be warranted or unwar-
ranted and that in feeling them we can violate various moral and prudential norms. 
 19   " is brings out the fact that to identify negative reactive emotions as demands is to identify them 
as subject to modes of assessment to which no other emotions are subject. To my mind, this is an aw-
fully big bullet to bite. To be sure, the reactive emotions are special—they are special insofar as they are 
key constituents in our practices of holding responsible. However, they can be special in this way with-
out running roughshod over their status as emotions. 
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 It should not be that surprising that expressions of the reactive attitudes do 
not require the authority distinctive of demands. Demands are a unique kind of 
speech act. As I emphasized earlier, demands make it the case that their target 
must do as demanded because it was demanded. To demand is to make anoth-
er’s will an instrument of your own. " ere are countless other speech acts— 
invitations, pleas, assertions, and conjectures, to name a few—that are not 
heavy-handed in the way that demands are and thus do not require the authority 
that demands do. " e above scenarios merely point to the fact that on matters of 
authority, expressions of the reactive attitudes join most other speech acts. 
 My - nal critique of the demands qua speech act view draws on a point 
made earlier, namely, that there is a certain sort of propriety in the target of a 
demand doing as the propositional content directs. We can now put this point 
more precisely: demands seek compliance, which is simply to say that demands 
are fully successful as the kind of thing they are just in case their target does as 
demanded because she was so demanded. To be sure, there are what one might 
think of as diminished forms of success. For example, if I demand that my 
children clean their room, and they do so for some other reason than because 
I demanded it, then my demand is partially successful. Technically put, in this 
case my children have conformed to but not complied with my demand. And 
it is true that conformity falls short of rendering a demand fully successful 
even if the demander herself is perfectly satis- ed with conformity. What sat-
is- es the demander is one thing, and what satis- es the demand is another. 
While I may want my children to clean their room—not caring one bit about 
their reasons for doing so—my demand is not so laid back: it, as it were, wants 
my children to clean their room and do so  because it was demanded (Searle 
and Vanderveken  1985 , p. 14). 
 But if this is what demands want, then both the moral requirement view 
and the acknowledging fault view of content are problematic. " e former 
suggests an implausible account of the response sought by the negative reac-
tive attitudes, and the latter suggests that the negative reactive attitudes 
make an  unintelligible demand. 
 Recall that on the moral requirement view, the content of the demand con-
stitutive of a negative reactive attitude mirrors the content of the standing 
moral requirement that underwrites it. " is implies that a negative reactive 
attitude is fully successful just in case the target of that attitude complies with 
the demand the \ outing of which prompted the attitude. To see why this is a 
problematic account of the success conditions, consider the following ex-
ample. Imagine that I intentionally trip you, and you feel resentment and 
express that resentment to me. When I trip you, I violate a moral requirement: 
Don’t intentionally trip others. On the moral requirement view of content, 
when you feel and express your resentment, you, as it were, give voice to this 
moral requirement. Your resentment makes a demand with the same content 
as the demand I violated. When you resent me, you are, in essence, demanding 
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that I not intentionally trip you. What this implies is that your resentment will 
be fully successful just in case I respond by not intentionally tripping you 
because you so demanded. 
 But when you consider the fact that I have already tripped you, options for 
complying with your demand are rather limited. I cannot comply with respect 
to the o] ending action, since it is already in the past; it is not as though I can 
change the past so that I never tripped you. Future compliance, of course, is 
possible; I can refrain from tripping you in the future. But while we can agree 
that this would be a good thing, such forbearance is not a satisfying account of 
the response resentment seeks. It is highly implausible that my merely not in-
tentionally tripping you in the future renders your expression of resentment 
successful. If you take me to task for tripping you and I respond simply by 
saying “Okay, I won’t trip you in the future,” my guess is that you would be 
taken aback. What about the fact that I have already tripped you? Resentment 
is a response to a past wrong, and whatever else we say about the response it 
seeks, it needs to be at least in part about this past wrong. An account of the 
content of the demand constitutive of the negative reactive attitudes that 
entails that the success-constituting response is as thoroughly forward-looking 
as “Okay, I won’t intentionally trip you in the future” is hard to swallow. " e 
de- ning response to resentment must involve a backward-looking element. 20 
 " is critique of the moral requirement view points us directly toward the 
acknowledgment of fault account of content. If the negative reactive attitudes 
demand that their target feel guilt and express it via apology and amends, then 
these attitudes are fully successful when their target feels and expresses guilt 
because it was so demanded. " is response  is suitably backward-looking. 
When we feel guilt and express it via apology and amends we appropriately 
redress the wrong that gave rise to resentment, indignation, or disapprobation. 
 But while the acknowledgment of fault view plausibly captures the response 
sought by the negative reactive attitudes, it fails because it implies that these 
attitudes are constituted by an unintelligible demand. 
 As we saw earlier, an agent issues a felicitous demand only if she possesses the 
requisite authority. " e mugger’s demand that I hand over my wallet is infelicitous 
because the mugger lacks the requisite authority. But, strictly speaking, not all in-
felicities stem from a lack of authority. A demand can be infelicitous because the 
target of the demand is incapable either of understanding or of complying with the 
demand. " ese are, to use Watson’s phrase, “constraints on moral address” (1987b, 
p. 229). When a demand is infelicitous because the target is incapable of under-
standing or complying with the demand, the demand is said to be unintelligible. 
 " e emotional component of acknowledging one’s fault—that is, feeling 
guilt—is simply not the sort of thing that can be intelligibly demanded of another. 
 20   See Talbert ( 2012 ) for another objection to the moral requirement view of content. 
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To comply with a demand, one must do as directed because it was directed. But 
feeling guilt is not something we can do at the direction of another. We can no 
more bring it about that we feel genuine guilt on command than we can bring it 
about that we digest our food on command. With guilt we can, as it were, go 
through the motions; feigning guilt is possible, of course, but  feigning guilt is not 
what is demanded of us. We can also work to develop our capacity for and sensi-
tivity to guilt; emotions are susceptible to this sort of “indirect” control. What we 
cannot do is will the genuine feeling of guilt as a response to another’s authority. 21 
 But perhaps the demand view is salvageable. What if we simply take guilt 
out of the equation? Perhaps the negative reactive attitudes demand not that 
their target feel guilt and express it but rather that they simply apologize and 
make amends. No guilt, no problem. 
 " is, I want to urge, is not a suitable solution. " e key reason is that on this 
view, the negative reactive attitudes are fully successful when they receive an 
insincere apology. To be sure, sometimes the person who feels resentment, in-
dignation, or disapprobation would - nd even an insincere apology satisfying. 
Likewise it certainly seems true that a negative reactive attitude has achieved a 
degree of success in eliciting an insincere apology. But as we saw earlier, what a 
demander - nds fully satisfying is one thing, and what fully satis- es the demand 
is another. And again, partial success is one thing and full success another. For 
the demand view of the reactive attitudes to succeed, it needs to be true that the 
negative reactive attitudes are  fully successful when they are met with an insin-
cere apology (and amends); this, though, seems implausible. To say that an 
apology is insincere is to mark it as hollow, that is, as defective in some way. And 
if the reactive attitudes are at all successful when they meet with a defective 
apology it is hard to see why they would not be more successful when they 
receive the real deal. 22 
 " us once we take seriously various features of demands—that they are 
speech acts, that they require authority, and that they seek compliance—we see 
that the demand qua speech act view of the negative reactive attitudes faces far 
more serious problems than were immediately apparent. 
 4 .  Seeking a Response 
 As we saw in the previous section, identifying the negative reactive attitudes 
as demands qua speech act implies that they seek a response. But as with any 
implication, the denial of the antecedent does not entail the denial of the 
consequent. " e negative reactive attitudes need not be demands—or even 
 21   For additional objections to Darwall’s characterization of the reactive attitudes see Wallace 
( 2007 ). 
 22   For an excellent analysis of apologies see Smith ( 2008 ). 
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for that matter speech acts at all—to be the sort of thing that seeks a response 
from their target. ‘Demand’ is used in its third and - nal way to point to the 
fact that the negative reactive attitudes seek a response. 
 In this section I argue that Walker uses ‘demand’ in precisely this way. 23 
Consider the following quotes: “When we express and direct our resentment 
or indignation at a norm violator, we demand some rectifying response from 
the one who is perceived as out of bounds” (Walker  2006 , p. 26). “Resentment 
and indignation in particular express a - nding of  fault of others and a  demand 
on them for an appropriate response” (p. 25). 24 It is tempting to read Walker as 
simply echoing Darwall’s position, that is, as endorsing the demand qua speech 
act view. But examination of these quotes in the context of her work as a whole 
gives us strong reason to resist this temptation. First, as I mentioned in the 
previous section, one of the main reasons to attribute the demand qua speech 
act view to Darwall is his frequent invocation of speech act theory. But Walk-
er’s work makes no mention of speech act theory. Second and more important, 
Walker does not exclusively or even predominantly use the language of 
demands when discussing the reactive attitudes and their sought response. 
 Consider the following passages from Walker: “[R]esentment not only 
sends a message but  invites a response” (2006, p. 114, my italics; see also p. 134). 
“[R]esentment both expresses a sense of wrong and  calls out to others for rec-
ognition and a reparative response” (p. 136, my italics; see also p. 138). “It is 
surely correct that resentment of serious wrong, experienced or expressed by 
victims or others,  requires a response” (p. 138, my italics). “Resentment at se-
rious wrong, then,  deserves responses from wrongdoers” (p. 138, my italics). 
 It is clear from these passages that Walker holds that there is a crucial rela-
tionship between the reactive attitudes and their responses—a sentiment that, 
interestingly enough, is championed throughout the reactive attitudes litera-
ture. 25 But while Walker unquestionably takes the negative reactive attitudes to 
 23   Strictly speaking, Walker holds that the negative reactive attitudes seek a response not just from 
their target but also from the wider community. While numerous theorists posit a relationship between 
the negative reactive attitudes and a response from their target (see note 26), Walker stands alone in 
positing a relationship between these attitudes and the wider community. Since I focus on Walker 
primarily because she is representative of a broader trend in the literature, I focus solely on her claim 
that the negative reactive attitudes seek a response from their target. 
 24   For additional passages in which Walker speaks of resentment’s demands see her 2008 (pp. 140, 
143, 149). 
 25   Some theorists employ precisely the locutions Walker does. Smith, McGeer, and Darwall all char-
acterize the reactive attitudes as “calling for” or “calling upon” the target to respond (Smith  2008b , p. 
281; McGeer  2011 , p. 303; Darwall  2006 , pp. 145, 170). But theorists such as Darwall, Shoemaker, and 
McGeer also deploy other terms. Darwall describes the reactive attitudes as  seeking a response (2011, 
p. 331). Shoemaker tells us that a reactive attitude is “an emotional address,  urging the wrongdoer to feel 
what I feel as a result of his wrongdoing and then subsequently to feel the guilt or remorse (at having 
caused that feeling) which I expect to motivate him to cease his wrongdoing” (2007, p. 51). And accord-
ing to McGeer, the reactive attitudes “serve to elicit a response,” and their “aim is to elicit such  responses” 
(2011, pp. 304, 316). 
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be importantly connected to a response from their target, it is not yet clear 
what she thinks this connection amounts to. What, in other words, is she get-
ting at when she says that the negative reactive attitudes “demand” or “invite” 
or “call for” or “require” or “deserve” a response? 
 I propose that Walker is claiming that the negative reactive attitudes are 
fully successful just in case they elicit a response from their target. Each of the 
terms she uses to describe the relationship between the reactive attitudes and 
their de- ning responses can be read as pointing to this sentiment. 
 Start with “reactive attitudes  deserve a response.” Read most broadly, this 
means that there is a certain sort of propriety in the reactive attitudes’ receiving 
a response or that there is something normatively correct in the target’s re-
plying. Insofar as success carries with it the notion of propriety or normativity, 
the phrase “reactive attitudes deserve a response” is simply a more general way 
of putting the claim that negative reactive attitudes are fully successful just in 
case the target responds. 
 " e claims that the reactive attitudes “demand,” “call for,” and “require” a 
response also point to the idea of success conditions. Each of these terms can 
be used to indicate that one thing is in need of another: parenting demands 
patience; trees require sunlight; philosophy calls for dedication. Walker argu-
ably uses these terms in much the same way to suggest that the negative reac-
tive attitudes are “in need of ” a response—that is, that they need a response for 
success. 
 But there is another way to interpret the claims that the negative reactive 
attitudes “demand,” “call for,” or “require” a response. " is second interpreta-
tion, like the - rst, points to the idea of success conditions, and this interpreta-
tion has the added bene- t of being equally illuminative of the claim that “the 
reactive attitudes  invite a response.” 
 " e terms ‘demand’ and ‘invite’ can be used to refer to two distinct speech 
acts. But while it is one thing to demand and another to invite, both of these 
speech acts are of the same general kind: both are directives, that is, speech acts 
that aim at getting another to do something. ‘Require’ and ‘call for’ can also be 
used to refer to a speech act; these terms, though, refer to directives generically 
rather than particular kinds of directives. " us ‘require’ and ‘call for’ are oV en 
used interchangeably with one another and with ‘demand’ and ‘invite.’ 
 " us we might read Walker as suggesting that, - guratively speaking, the 
negative reactive attitudes issue a directive. In other words, she might be, as it 
were, anthropomorphizing the negative reactive attitudes. It is when we con-
sider the point of this anthropomorphization that we see the connection to 
success conditions. " e fact that Mary demands that Joe ϕ is a reliable indi-
cator that Mary aims for Joe to ϕ. " is is just an instance of the broader point 
that people’s actions are oV en reliable indicators of their aims. What this sug-
gests is that anthropomorphizing something by characterizing it as acting in 
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various ways can serve to convey the anthropomorphized object’s aim. Just as 
we can read a person’s aims o]  her actions, we can read the aims of the anthro-
pomorphized object o]  its actions. It is possible, then, that in depicting the 
negative reactive attitudes as demanding, inviting, calling for, and requiring a 
response, Walker is trying to convey that they aim at a response. But this leads 
us directly to success conditions. If the negative reactive attitudes aim at a 
response, then they are fully successful as the kind of thing they are only if they 
receive the response aimed at. 
 If this last interpretation of Walker is correct, then like Darwall, she uses 
‘demand’ to refer to a speech act. But unlike Darwall, she is using the term 
- guratively, and for her, ‘demand’ is simply a stand-in for a generic directive. 
Darwall, in other words, is using the term ‘demand’ literally and speci- cally, in 
contrast to Walker’s - gurative and generic usage. 
 To my mind, there is nothing illicit, strictly speaking, about Walker’s use of 
‘demand.’ In fact, I endorse the claim that negative reactive attitudes are fully 
successful just in case they receive a response from their target. " at said, I do 
think it is infelicitous to use the term ‘demand’ to express this important point. 
" e phrase “reactive attitudes demand a response” does not convey this point 
with an optimum level of precision and clarity. And while this would not be a 
decisive strike against a turn of phrase in most contexts, it approximates such 
a strike here, insofar as this context renders “reactive attitudes demand a 
response” ripe for misinterpretations. And these points hold even if I have 
misinterpreted Walker’s position on the relationship between the negative re-
active attitudes and their response. Whatever relationship the phrase “the neg-
ative reactive attitudes demand a response” is pointing to, there is bound to be 
a more precise rendering and, more important, a way of expressing it that does 
not invite misinterpretation. 
 5 .  Conclusion 
 Even those who - nd what I have said thus far compelling may be reluctant to 
take the demands out of negative reactive attitudes in the ways I have sug-
gested. " ere are those who may be committed to the idea that the negative 
reactive attitudes are forms of moral address, or to the idea that demanding is 
a way of holding responsible, or to the idea that wrongdoing merits some 
unique response from the moral community. " ese theorists may worry that 
taking the demands out of the negative reactive attitudes will require them to 
abandon these strongly held beliefs. I conclude by showing that these concerns 
are unwarranted. 
 Let’s start with moral address. " e negative reactive attitudes can be forms 
of moral address even if they are not demands qua speech act. To see this, we 
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simply need to bring to mind the fact that many kinds of speech acts constitute 
forms of address: questions, invitations, hails, recommendations, and en-
treaties all - t the bill. It is possible that the expressed negative reactive attitudes 
are aptly assimilated to one of these speech acts. In fact, I have argued else-
where that they share quite a bit in common with the hail. Whereas a hail—
“Hi, Mary” or “Hello, Joe”—recognizes its target as Mary or Joe, an expressed 
negative reactive attitude recognizes its target as having done something wrong 
(or bad) (Macnamara Forthcoming). 
 What’s more, much depends on what being a form of moral address con-
sists in. Address is arguably a functionally speci- ed concept, such that some-
thing is a form of address if it seeks a response. If this is the case, then the 
negative reactive attitudes need not be speech acts at all to count as forms of 
moral address. It need only be the case that we can’t understand the negative 
reactive attitudes as the kind of thing they are without understanding that they 
are successful just in case they receive the reply they seek. 26 If the unexpressed 
reactive attitudes are forms of address in this sense, they are forms of moral 
address in much the same way as an unsent invitation. 
 Turn now to demanding as a way of holding responsible. To reject the 
demand qua speech act view is not to reject the claim that demanding that an-
other do as she ought is a way of holding her responsible. It is possible that the 
negative reactive attitudes and their expressions constitute one way of holding 
responsible, and demanding constitutes another. In fact, I have elsewhere 
argued for precisely this view (Macnamara  2011 ). On my view, our practice of 
holding another responsible has both a backward-looking face that includes 
the negative reactive attitudes and their expressions and a  forward-looking face 
that includes demanding that another do as she ought. We demand that an-
other do as she ought not in response to actual moral violations—this is the 
domain of blame—but rather in response to threatened infractions. Sometimes 
we anticipate that someone might \ out a moral requirement, and when we do, 
we might hold her responsible before wrongdoing commences. 
 To see what I am getting at, consider the following. In college my house-
mates and I decided that we would not buy household food; each person 
agreed to buy her own food and not to dip into the others’ stashes. Even though 
everyone was well aware of the food rules, incidents of late-night looting were 
commonplace, and leV over pizza was the most vulnerable foodstu] . One night 
my roommate Norah was up late studying and ordered a pizza—a large pizza 
in fact, speci- cally with the intention of having the leV overs for breakfast the 
next day. As Norah was going to bed, worrying about whether her pizza would 
be in the fridge in the morning, she decided to take control: she put a Post-it 
note on her pizza box that read “NO TOUCHY.” In her own clever way Norah 
demanded that we, her roommates, do as we ought: she demanded that we 
 26   See Kukla and Lance ( 2009 ) for an example of an argument for this view of address. 
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keep our late-night looting hands o]  her pizza. On my view, in doing this she 
held us responsible, not in response to a violation but to forestall one. 
 Finally, one can concede that negative reactive attitudes are connected not 
just to wrong but also to bad and still hold that violations of deontic normative 
material warrant a unique response. Arguably the negative reactive attitudes 
and their expressions are not the only form of blame. On my own view, for 
example, there are the negative reactive attitudes and their expressions on the 
one hand, and what I would call “enforcement blame” on the other. Enforce-
ment blame is like demands qua speech act and unlike the negative reactive 
attitudes in that it involves an element of subordination and thus requires 
authority. Enforcement blame is, then, demand-like but not strictly speaking 
a demand. Enforcement blame, on my view, is connected exclusively to the 
 deontic realm: it is the distinctive pragmatic upshot of wrongdoing. 
 " e point of this concluding section is, of course, not to convince you that 
moral address is a functionally speci- ed concept, or that there exist two dis-
tinct forms of blame—one at home in both the evaluative and deontic realms 
and the other limited to the deontic—or that blaming another is one way of 
holding responsible, and demanding that someone do as she ought is another 
way. Rather, the point is simply to show that there is conceptual space between 
the claim that demands are an essential element of any analysis of the negative 
reactive attitudes and claims about moral address, holding responsible, and 
blame’s relationship to the deontic realm. 
